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Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs

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We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0205.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0205.

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Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0205

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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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  1. repec:fth:iniesr:534 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. J. Robinson, 1969. "An Iterative Method of Solving a Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 422, David K. Levine.
  3. CHEN, Hsiao-Ch. & FRIEDMAN, J.W. & THISSE, Jacques-Francois, 1996. "Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach," CORE Discussion Papers 1996044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  5. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  7. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
  8. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
  9. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
  10. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
  11. Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning in perturbed asymmetric games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July.
  12. Antonella Ianni, . "Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games," Penn CARESS Working Papers 34ac2118b0340df9732abdd0b, Penn Economics Department.
  13. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  14. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  15. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  16. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  17. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994.
  18. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  19. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
  20. R. Pemantle, 2010. "Non-convergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 483, David K. Levine.
  21. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  22. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  23. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1981. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1483-1536, December.
  24. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
  25. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  26. Lawrence Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Game Theory and Information 9607001, EconWPA.
  27. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  28. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  29. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  30. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Working papers 16, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  2. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Mattsson, Lars-Goran & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 61-78, October.
  4. N. Williams, 2002. "Stability and Long Run Equilibrium in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers cbeeeb49cc8afc83f125df5a8, David K. Levine.
  5. Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

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