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The evolution of cooperation through imitation

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  • Levine, David K.
  • Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 293-315

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:2:p:293-315

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
  2. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
  4. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September.
  5. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2001. "Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 1-21, September.
  8. Damme, E.E.C. van & Weibull, J., 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1998-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. A. J. Robson, 2010. "Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake," Levine's Working Paper Archive 540, David K. Levine.
  10. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  11. Kirman, Alan, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-56, February.
  12. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  13. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  14. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  15. repec:fth:iniesr:501 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Steinbacher, Matjaz, 2008. "Stochastic Processes in Finance and Behavioral Finance," MPRA Paper 13603, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Rivas, Javier, 2013. "Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 148-162.
  3. Astrid Matthey, 2006. "Imitation with Intention and Memory: an Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-088, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  4. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Learning To Play Approximate Nash Equilibria In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 671, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  6. Dawid, Herbert, 2007. "Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2108-2133, June.
  7. Pedro Dal Bó & Enrique R. Pujals, 2013. "The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation," Working Papers 2013-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2012. "Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2012-031, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  10. Edward Cartwright, 2007. "Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 119-135, September.
  11. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-29, February.
  12. Juan I Block & David K Levine, 2012. "Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000480, David K. Levine.
  13. Mengel, Friederike, 2007. "Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model," MPRA Paper 4051, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Steinbacher, Matjaz, 2009. "Behavior of Investors on a Multi-Asset Market," MPRA Paper 15898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2013. "Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 289-306.

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