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Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game

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  • Philip Johnson
  • David K. Levine
  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/PAPERS/evob25.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 162.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:162

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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References

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  1. Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
  2. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  3. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  4. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March.
  4. Kevin Hasker, 2004. "The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution," Departmental Working Papers, Bilkent University, Department of Economics 0406, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  5. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frechette, . "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2007-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Joel Sobel, 2002. "Can We Trust Social Capital?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 139-154, March.
  8. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
  10. Kevin Hasker, 2005. "Note: Using the Emergent Seed to Completely Characterize 'Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game'," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000142, David K. Levine.
  11. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2010. "On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, September.
  12. Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2007. "The evolution of cooperation through imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 293-315, February.
  13. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
  14. Pedro Dal Bó & Enrique R. Pujals, 2013. "The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation," Working Papers 2013-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, David K. Levine.

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