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Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population

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Author Info
David K Levine
Wolfgang Pesendorfer

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 2122.

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Date of creation: 09 May 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:2122

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Damme, E. van & Weibull, J.W., 1998. "Evolution with mutations driven by control costs," Discussion Paper 94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Phil Johnson, 1999. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Theory workshop papers 168, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Edward Cartwright, 2004. "Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players," Working Papers 2004.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schnedler, Wendelin, 2003. "Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics," IZA Discussion Papers 849, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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