Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics
AbstractIn this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the resulting dynamics are a multivariate stochastic process. An example for such a process is simulated. The results resemble the replicator dynamics to a remarkable degree. If traits moderately depend on the past, this accelerates convergence of the dynamics towards a stable state. If the dependence is strong, the stable state is not reached.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 849.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2003. "Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2003. "Traits, Imitation and Evolutionary Dynamics," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/081, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-08-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2003-08-17 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2003-08-17 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
- D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010.
"Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
546, David K. Levine.
- Amann, Erwin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 1998. "Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-105, September.
- Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000.
"Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games,"
Working Paper Series
534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001.
- Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05.
- David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1989. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 588-93, June.
- Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.