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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces

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  • Thomas Norman

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 251.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:251

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Keywords: Replicator dynamics; Evolutionary stability; Continouus strategy spaces; Stable sets;

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Cited by:
  1. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2012. "Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 311-320.

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