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Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

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Author Info

  • Joerg Oechssler

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

  • Frank Riedel

    (Humboldt University)

Abstract

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9805/9805002.ps.gz
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9805002.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 08 May 1998
Date of revision: 12 May 1998
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9805002

Note: pages: 26
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; continuous strategy spaces; oligopoly;

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  1. Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg, 1997. "Learning to like what you have: Explaining the endowment effect," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,38, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  3. J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
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