Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition
AbstractThe common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updating a common prior based on individual information. Common priors are pervasive in most economic models of incomplete information and oligopoly models with asymmetrically informed firms. We dispose of the common prior assumption for a homogeneous oligopoly market with uncertain costs and firms entertaining arbitrary priors about other firms’ cost-type to analyze which priors will be evolutionarily stable when truly expected profit measures (reproductive) success. When firms believe that all other firms entertain the same beliefs Nature’s priors are not the only evolutionarily stable priors. In a second model allowing for asymmetric priors Nature’s priors are not even evolutionarily stable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2006-37.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Werner Güth & Loreto Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2011. "Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 843-852, December.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-01-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EVO-2007-01-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-IND-2007-01-23 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-01-23 (Microeconomics)
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