Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Faruk Gul

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 66 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 923-928
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:66:y:1998:i:4:p:923-928

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007. "Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1073-1073 is not listed on IDEAS
   Other versions:
   • P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
4. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005. "When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?," Discussion Paper Series dp387, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
   • R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
5. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Felipe Zurita, 2004. "Essays on Speculation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000849, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
7. Robin Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2005. "Common reasoning in games: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’," Discussion Papers 2005-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
8. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2006. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," NBER Working Papers 12648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 48, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
9. Oliver Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2008. "Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 378, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]
10. Werner Güth & Loreto Llorente Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
11. Werner Güth & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER & Loreto LLORENTE ERVITI, 2004. "Quantity Competition under Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
12. Cason, Timothy N. & Sharma, Tridib, 2006. "Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1191, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Timothy Cason & Tridib Sharma, 2007. "Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 11-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
14. Hellman, Ziv, 2007. "Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree," MPRA Paper 3404, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
15. Felipe Zurita, 2004. "Beyond Earthquakes: The New Directions of Expected Utility Theory," Documentos de Trabajo 260, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Felipe Zurita, 2005. "Beyond Earthquakes: The New Directions of Expected Utility Theory," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 42(126), pages 209-255. [Downloadable!]
16. Felipe Zurita, 2001. "Speculation in Financial Markets: A Survey," Documentos de Trabajo 197, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
17. Shmuel Zamir, 2008. "Bayesian games: games of incomplete information," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002215, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.