IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/iastwp/127808.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity

Author

Listed:
  • Alger, Ingela
  • Lehmann, Laurent

Abstract

We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including con-ditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the conver-gence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated literatures.

Suggested Citation

  • Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent, 2023. "Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity," IAST Working Papers 23-148, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised May 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:iastwp:127808
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://iast.fr/pub/127808
    File Function: null
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.iast.fr/sites/default/files/IAST/wp/wp_iast_148.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
    2. Ingela Alger, 2010. "Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 789-813, August.
    3. Miettinen, Topi & Kosfeld, Michael & Fehr, Ernst & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-25.
    4. Avila, Piret & Mullon, Charles, 2023. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Adaptive Dynamics Approach: Adaptation where Individuals Interact," IAST Working Papers 23-150, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    5. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
    6. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2023. "Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum," TSE Working Papers 23-1406, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2019. "Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 329-354, August.
    8. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2015. "Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?," TSE Working Papers 15-561, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Adrian Bruhin & Ernst Fehr & Daniel Schunk, 2019. "The many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1025-1069.
    10. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    11. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2010. "Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1725-1758, September.
    12. Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March.
    13. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    14. Guth, Werner, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(4), pages 323-344.
    15. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    16. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent, 2020. "Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    17. Ok, Efe A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2001. "On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 231-254, April.
    18. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    19. Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
    20. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2016. "Evolution and Kantian morality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 56-67.
    21. John M. McNamara & Catherine E. Gasson & Alasdair I Houston, 1999. "Incorporating rules for responding into evolutionary games," Nature, Nature, vol. 401(6751), pages 368-371, September.
    22. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    23. Ingela Alger, 2010. "Corrigendum: Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(6), pages 1135-1135, December.
    24. Bolle, Friedel, 2000. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence?: Remarks on Bester and Guth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 131-133, May.
    25. Alger, Ingela, 2022. "Evolutionarily stable preferences," TSE Working Papers 22-1355, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2022.
    26. Adrian Bruhin & Ernst Fehr & Daniel Schunk, 2019. "Correction to: The Many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1335-1335.
    27. Priklopil, Tadeas & Lehmann, Laurent, 2021. "Metacommunities, fitness and gradual evolution," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 12-35.
    28. Piret Avila & Charles Mullon, 2023. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Adaptive Dynamics Approach: Adaptation where Individuals Interact," Post-Print hal-04067694, HAL.
    29. repec:hhs:iuiwop:487 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2007. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 251-286, August.
    31. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    32. Eddie Dekel & Jeffrey C. Ely & Okan Yilankaya, 2007. "Evolution of Preferences -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 685-704.
    33. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    2. Christian Hilbe & Maria Kleshnina & Kateřina Staňková, 2023. "Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1035-1048, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alger, Ingela, 2022. "Evolutionarily stable preferences," TSE Working Papers 22-1355, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2022.
    2. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2016. "Evolution and Kantian morality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 56-67.
    3. Lahkar, Ratul, 2019. "Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 150-165.
    4. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent, 2020. "Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.
    6. Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labelling, homophily and preference evolution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-22, March.
    7. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 1-18.
    8. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2021. "Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 206-226.
    9. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Political Institutions and Preference Evolution," MPRA Paper 69597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture," IAST Working Papers 18-73, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Oct 2019.
    11. Christian Hilbe & Maria Kleshnina & Kateřina Staňková, 2023. "Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1035-1048, December.
    12. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2014. "Evolution leads to Kantian morality," TSE Working Papers 14-504, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2015.
    13. Wu, Jiabin, 2017. "Political institutions and the evolution of character traits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 260-276.
    14. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    15. Ayoubi, Charles & Thurm, Boris, 2020. "Evolution and Heterogeneity of Social Preferences," OSF Preprints ucx8z, Center for Open Science.
    16. Carrasco, Jose A. & Harrison, Rodrigo & Villena, Mauricio G., 2022. "Strategic reciprocity and preference formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 368-381.
    17. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    18. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    19. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wu, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 121, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    20. Alger, Ingela & Van Leeuwen, Boris, 2019. "Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions," TSE Working Papers 19-1056, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2023.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:iastwp:127808. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iasttfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.