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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection

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  • Larry Samuelson

    ()
    (Yale University)

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    Abstract

    Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book goes on to discuss evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.

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    Bibliographic Info

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    This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262692198 and published in 1998.

    Volume: 1
    Edition: 1
    ISBN: 0-262-69219-8
    Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262692198

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    Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

    Related research

    Keywords: evolutionary game theory; the equilibrium selection problem; noncooperative games;

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    Cited by:
    1. Jiong Gong & Preston McAfee & Michael A Williams, 2011. "Fraud Cycles," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001154, David K. Levine.
      • Gong, Jiong & McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael, 2011. "Fraud cycles," MPRA Paper 28934, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Engseld, Peter, 2005. "Conditioned Actions in Strategic Coordination Games," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:33, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    3. Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and sophistication in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 450-472, December.
    4. Villani, Salvatore, 2008. "L’emergenza dei tre lustri, la salma contesa e il gioco dell’Ultimatum. Alcune riflessioni sui problemi che caratterizzano le decisioni pubbliche in Italia
      [The 15-years-long emergency, the bur
      ," MPRA Paper 29857, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Sep 2008.
    5. Huw Dixon & Ernesto Somma, . "Coordination and Equilibrium selection in mean defined supermodular games under payoff monotonic selection dynamics," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 99/37, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Derek Yonai, 2007. "Conceptions of property rights and norms," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 161-176, September.
    7. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2005. "A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift," IKERLANAK, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I 2005-19, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    8. Friesz, Terry L. & Kim, Taeil & Kwon, Changhyun & Rigdon, Matthew A., 2011. "Approximate network loading and dual-time-scale dynamic user equilibrium," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 176-207, January.
    9. J. Doyne Farmer, 1999. "Market Force, Ecology, and Evolution," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999, Society for Computational Economics 651, Society for Computational Economics.
    10. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, . "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    12. Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"," Scholarly Articles 3208222, Harvard University Department of Economics.

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