Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Evolution of Preferences -super-1

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eddie Dekel
  • Jeffrey C. Ely
  • Okan Yilankaya

Abstract

We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may observe the opponents' preferences perfectly, not at all, or with some in-between probability. When preferences are observable, a stable outcome must be efficient. When they are not observable, a stable outcome must be a Nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable. We show that, for pure-strategy outcomes, these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect, and almost no, observability, with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability (despite being stable with no observability). Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/74.3.685
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 74 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 685-704

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:685-704

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
  2. De Fraja, Gianni, 2009. "The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 51-69, October.
  3. Zubrickas, Robertas, 2012. "How exposure to markets can favor inequity-averse preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 174-181.
  4. Mohlin, Erik, 2012. "Evolution of theories of mind," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 299-318.
  5. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Where do preferences come from?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 613-637, August.
  6. Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp521, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Alger, Ingela & Cox, Donald, 2012. "The Evolution of Altruistic Preferences: Mothers versus Fathers," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 758, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised May 2013.
  8. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
  9. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2012. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 13963, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. Bulte, Erwin H. & Horan, Richard D., 2011. "Intergenerational transmission of preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 85-87, July.
  11. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 542-551, November.
  12. Erik Mohlin, 2010. "Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 169-181, April.
  13. Julian Jamison, 2012. "Games with Synergistic Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(1), pages 41-55, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:685-704. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.