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On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings

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  • Theodore C. Bergstrom

Abstract

This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists� kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. We show that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a ��semi-Kantian�� utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants.

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Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 017.

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Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:017

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  1. Rogers, Alan R, 1994. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 460-81, June.
  2. Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, . "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers, University of Michigan, Department of Economics _024, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  4. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  6. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1978. "Natural Economy Versus Political Economy," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 129, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  10. Jack Hirshleifer, 1977. "Economics from a Biological Viewpoint," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 087, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1977. "Economics from a Biological Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 1-52, April.
  12. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  13. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1990. "Malthusian Selection of Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 529-44, June.
  14. Robson, Arthur J, 1992. "Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 837-57, July.
  15. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 817-26, September.
  16. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
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