If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?

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If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?

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Frank, Robert H

Abstract

A blush may reveal a lie and cause great embarrassment at the moment. But in situations that require trust, there can be great advantage in being known to be a blusher. This paper develops a model in which tastes are determined endogenously for their capacity to help solve an important class of market failures. The common feature of these market failures is that they require people to bind themselves to courses of action that will later seem unattractive. The tastes that emerge are very different from the ones assumed in conventional rational-choice models. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 77 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 593-604
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:4:p:593-604

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