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The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given

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Author Info
Dirk Engelmann ()
Martin Strobel ()

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Abstract

We present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round, sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects' choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. When we do not provide information, the presence of a false consensus effect cannot be detected. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1011472501737
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 241-260
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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:241-260

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Related research
Keywords: false consensor; experimental economics;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-45, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Selten, Reinhard & Ockenfels, Axel, 1998. "An experimental solidarity game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 517-539, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jacobsen, Eva & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1996. "Experimental Proof for the Motivational Importance of Reciprocity," Discussion Paper Serie B 386, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Camerer, Colin, 1995. "Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ," Working Papers 946, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Eline Heijden & Jan Nelissen & Jan Potters, 2007. "Opinions on the Tax Deductibility of Mortgages and the Consensus Effect," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(2), pages 141-159, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods," Discussion Papers 2006-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, 1999. "Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 436, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Nagore Iriberri & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2008. "Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?," Economics Working Papers 1137, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
  8. Heijden, E.C.M. van der & Nelissen, J.H.M. & Potters, J.J.M., 2004. "Opinions on tax deductions and the consensus effect in a survey-experiment," Discussion Paper 23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Werner Güth & Loreto Llorente Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  10. Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2008. "Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem?," IZA Discussion Papers 3517, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Güth, 2005. "Bargaining Outside the Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Cotton, Christopher & Price, Joseph, 2006. "The Hot Hand, Competitive Experience, and Performance Differences by Gender," MPRA Paper 1843, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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