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When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis

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Author Info
Werner G, th () (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Stra, e 10, 07745 Jena)
Bezalel Peleg (Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel)

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Abstract

Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 479-499
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:11:y:2001:i:5:p:479-499

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Related research
Keywords: Indirect) evolution - Endogenous preferences - Rationality - Incomplete information;

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  1. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Werner Güth & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER & Loreto LLORENTE ERVITI, 2004. "Quantity Competition under Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Werner Güth & Gerlinde Fellner & Ev Martin, 2006. "Satisficing or Optimizing? - An Experimental Study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Werner Güth & Loreto Llorente Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  7. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Wolfgang Leininger, 2008. "Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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