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When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis

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  • Werner G, th

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Stra, e 10, 07745 Jena)

  • Bezalel Peleg

    (Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel)

Abstract

Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 479-499

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:11:y:2001:i:5:p:479-499

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Related research

Keywords: Indirect) evolution - Endogenous preferences - Rationality - Incomplete information;

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Cited by:
  1. Werner Güth & Loreto Llorente Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  2. Werner Güth & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER & Loreto LLORENTE ERVITI, 2004. "Quantity Competition under Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SHANNON, Chris & SPIEGEL, Yossi, 2003. "What to maximize if you must," CORE Discussion Papers 2003047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 257-302.
  5. Weibull, Jörgen & Salomonsson, Marcus, 2005. "Natural selection and social preferences," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 588, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 20 Jul 2005.
  6. Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1037-1056, October.
  7. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Werner Güth & Gerlinde Fellner & Ev Martin, 2006. "Satisficing or Optimizing? - An Experimental Study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  9. Smith, Peter, 2004. "Reworking the Standard Model of Competitive Markets: The Role of Fuzzy Logic and Genetic Algorithms in Modelling Complex Non-Linear Economic System," General Discussion Papers 30569, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
  10. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. Werne Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2009. "Evolutionstheorie und Ökonomik," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2009-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  12. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  13. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2002. "What to Maximize if You Must," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000063, David K. Levine.

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