The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process
AbstractIn this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always defection”, proving that there exists a strictly positive probability, which has a close link with the discount factor, that a single TFT individual can fully invade into a group of ALLD individuals; that is to say, TFT has some kind of evolutionary stability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40511.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2010
Date of revision:
IPD; Evolutionary Game Dynamics; Equilibrium Selection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 1998.
"Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
1998,68, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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- Oechssler, Joerg & Frank Riedel, 1999. "Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 606, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Alan Beggs, 2002.
"Stochastic evolution with slow learning,"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 379-405.
- Beggs, A., 2000. "Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 9933, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Alan Beggs, 2000. "Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 33, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- repec:wop:humbsf:1998-68 is not listed on IDEAS
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