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Evolutive Equilibrium Selection I: Symmetric Two Player Binarychoice Games

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Author Info
Richard Vaughan
Abstract

The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker- Planck dif-fusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the "basin of attraction" approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games.

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Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 016.

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Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:016

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Related research
Keywords: Symmetric Games; Equilibrium Selection;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  4. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. repec:att:wimass:199324 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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