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Evolutive Equilibrium Selection I: Symmetric Two Player Binarychoice Games

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  • Richard Vaughan
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    Abstract

    The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker- Planck dif-fusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the "basin of attraction" approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games.

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/els/esrcls/ees.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 016.

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    Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:016

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    Keywords: Symmetric Games; Equilibrium Selection;

    References

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    1. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    2. M. Kandori & R. Rob, 2010. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 502, David K. Levine.
    3. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    4. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through:Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9403005, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 1994.
    5. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1991. "Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games," Discussion Paper 1991-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. A. Cabrales, 2010. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 489, David K. Levine.
    7. J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
    8. Blume, Lawrence E., 2003. "How noise matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 251-271, August.
    9. repec:att:wimass:9324 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    11. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
    12. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    13. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
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