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Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games

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  • Weibull, Jorgen W.

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Pages: 641-649

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:641-649

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  1. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Working Paper Series 433, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
  3. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  4. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  6. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  7. T. Borgers & R. Sarin, 2010. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 380, David K. Levine.
  8. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  9. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 538, David K. Levine.
  11. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series 383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  12. repec:fth:coluec:9596-22 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November.
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  15. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
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  17. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.
  18. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Eckel, Catherine C., 2004. "Vernon Smith: economics as a laboratory science," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 15-28, March.
  2. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, EconWPA.
  3. Mari Rege, 1999. "Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods: Endogenous Peer Groups," Discussion Papers 257, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  4. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Cheap Talk and Spiteful Preferences in Ultimatum Games: Experiments and Evolutionary Rationale," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89223, Tilburg University.

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