Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning
AbstractThis paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 9933.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
GAMES ; RISK ; MUTATIONS;
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Dai, Darong, 2010. "The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process," MPRA Paper 40511, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Dai, Darong, 2010.
[The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process]," MPRA Paper 40261, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Gotts, Nicholas M. & Polhill, J. Gary, 2007. "Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 259-276, November.
- Dai, Darong, 2012. "Learning Nash Equilibria," MPRA Paper 40040, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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