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Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics

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  • Borgers, Tilman
  • Sarin, Rajiv

Abstract

This paper considers a version of Bush and Mosteller's stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We compare this model of learning to a model of biological evolution. The purpose is to investigate analogies between learning and evolution. We and that in the continuous time limit the biological model coincides with the deterministic, continuous time replicator process. We give conditions under which the same is true for the learning model. For the case that these conditions do not hold, we show that the replicator process continues to play an important role in characterising the continuous time limit of the learning model, but that a di�erent e�ect (\Probability Matching") enters as well.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 77 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 1-14

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:77:y:1997:i:1:p:1-14

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Boylan Richard T., 1995. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 615-625, August.
  3. repec:att:wimass:9410 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  5. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
  6. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
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  8. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic replicator dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
  11. E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer, 2010. "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 434, David K. Levine.
  12. Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1990. "A Model of Random Matching," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 887, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  14. E. Akin & V. Losert, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 424, David K. Levine.
  15. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
  16. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-99, November.
  17. Schmalensee, Richard, 1975. "Alternative models of bandit selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 333-342, June.
  18. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
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