Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
AbstractThis paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces that are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and the authors show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria and, hence, a strategically stable set in the sense of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 452.
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2010
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- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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- Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
- Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988.
"The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
- Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy, 1987. "The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 111, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
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