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What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?

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  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    ()
    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics. Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played many times in large populations of boundedly rational agents. This new strand in economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the following questions: What distinguishes the evolutionary approach from the rationalistic? What are the most important findings in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics?

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 487.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 16 Sep 1997
Date of revision: 26 Oct 1998
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0487

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Keywords: Game theory; Evolution;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Safarzyńska, Karolina & Brouwer, Roy & Hofkes, Marjan, 2013. "Evolutionary modelling of the macro-economic impacts of catastrophic flood events," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 108-118.
  2. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668.
  3. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," MPRA Paper 28889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. George A. Waters, 2011. "Endogenous Rational Bubbles," Working Paper Series 20111003, Illinois State University, Department of Economics.

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