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Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games

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Author Info
Ritzberger, Klaus
Weibull, Jorgen W

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Abstract

This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces that are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and the authors show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria and, hence, a strategically stable set in the sense of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1371-99
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:6:p:1371-99

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  2. Xavier Freixas & Sjaak Hurkens & Alan D. Morrison & Nir Vulkan, 2004. "Interbank Comptetition with Costly Screening," Economics Working Papers 802, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. Huw Dixon & Ernesto Somma, . "Coordination and Equilibrium selection in mean defined supermodular games under payoff monotonic selection dynamics," Discussion Papers 99/37, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  6. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Tilman Börgers & Rajiv Sarin, . "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," ELSE working papers 051, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  8. S. Huck & J. Oechssler, . "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach To Explaining Fair Allocations," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  9. Gaël Giraud, 2004. "The limit-price exchange process," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04118, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  10. repec:att:wimass:19199923 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," Economics working paper series 07/74, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  12. repec:att:wimass:192035 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002. "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series 115, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  14. William H. Sandholm, 1997. "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers 1198, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  15. Droste, E., 1999. "Habit formation and the evolution of social communication networks," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Andreas Blume, 1993. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9312002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  18. R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, . "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," ELSE working papers 027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Antonella Ianni, 2007. "Learning Strict Nash Equilibria through Reinforcement," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/21, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  20. Andreas Blume, 1996. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9604001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  21. Xavier Freixas & Sjaak Hurkens & Alan D. Morrison & Nir Vulkan, 2005. "Interbank Competition with Costly Screening," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  22. Filippo VERGARA CAFFARELLI, 2004. "Non-Cooperative Network Formation with Network Maintenance Costs," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/18, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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