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Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

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  • Viossat, Yannick

Abstract

We show on a 4×4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 27-43

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:27-43

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  12. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1119, Paris Dauphine University.
  13. A. Gaunersdorfer & J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 438, David K. Levine.
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  16. Viossat, Yannick, 2007. "The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1061, Paris Dauphine University.
  17. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1119, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Russell Golman, 2011. "Why learning doesn’t add up: equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 719-733, November.
  3. Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2012. "Regret Matching with Finite Memory," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 160-175, March.
  4. Yannick Viossat, 2012. "Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria," Working Papers hal-00756096, HAL.
  5. Yannick Viossat, 2011. "Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies," Working Papers hal-00636620, HAL.

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