This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gaunersdorfer Andrea
Hofbauer Josef

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45NJFN9-8/2/4bca6442a6ff050d2e1baf9d6b658b4b
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 11 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 279-303
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:279-303

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Reinoud Joosten, 2006. "Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(5), pages 561-573, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ulrich Berger & Josef Hofbauer, 2004. "Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics," Game Theory and Information 0409002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics," Discussion Papers 21, Kyiv School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ed Hopkins & Josef Hofbauer & Michel Benaim, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," ESE Discussion Papers 135, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. repec:att:wimass:1920221 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bill Sandholm, 2003. "Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins, 2009. "Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," ESE Discussion Papers 188, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ziv Gorodeisky, 2008. "Stochastic Approximation of Discontinuous Dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp496, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  10. Josef Hofbauer & Sylvain Sorin & Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Time Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics," Working Papers hal-00360767_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  11. A.F. Kleimenov & A.V. Kryazhimskii, 1998. "Normal Behavior, Altruism and Aggression in Cooperative Game Dynamics," Working Papers ir98076, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ulrich Berger, 2005. "Brown's Original Fictitious Play," Game Theory and Information 0503008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. repec:att:wimass:192035 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. William H. Sandholm, 1997. "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers 1198, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  16. Yannick Viossat, 2005. "Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers hal-00242977_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  18. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December. [Downloadable!]
  20. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  21. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Fictitious play in 2xn games," Game Theory and Information 0303009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.