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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

Author

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  • Yannick Viossat

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannick Viossat, 2014. "Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00756096, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00756096
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00756096
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    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00756096/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viossat, Yannick, 2007. "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 397-407, May.
    2. Sergiu Hart, 2013. "Adaptive Heuristics," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 11, pages 253-287, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1061 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1119 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Yannick Viossat, 2011. "Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies," Working Papers hal-00636620, HAL.
    7. Josef Hofbauer & Sylvain Sorin & Yannick Viossat, 2009. "Time Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics," Post-Print hal-00360767, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Sorin, 2023. "Continuous Time Learning Algorithms in Optimization and Game Theory," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 3-24, March.

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