Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
AbstractWe extend Aumann's  theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's  theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number Ikerlanak;2012-61.
Date of creation: 16 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2012. "Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria," Economics Working Papers 1326, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2012.
- Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2012. "Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp610, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2012. "Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 642, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-KNM-2012-10-20 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-MIC-2012-10-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2012-10-20 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- T. Börgers, 2010.
"Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
378, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart, 2004.
122247000000000471, UCLA Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alcira Macías Redondo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.