Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria
AbstractIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.
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Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Nash equilibrium; replicator dynamics; best-reply dynamics;
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