This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sergiu Hart
Andreu Mas-Colell

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/uncoupl-st.pdf?
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000466.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 17 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000466

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David K. Levine).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "Adaptive Heuristics," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000471, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 304, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  6. H. Peyton Young, 2008. "Learning by Trial and Error," Economics Series Working Papers 384, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp459, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.