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Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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  • Myerson, Roger B.

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This chapter was published in:

  • R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1994. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2, 00.
    This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 2-24.

    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-24

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

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    Cited by:
    1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
    2. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756, HAL.
    3. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000488, www.najecon.org.
    5. Serra Garcia, M. & Damme, E.E.C. van & Potters, J.J.M., 2008. "Truth or Efficiency? Communication in a Sequential Public Good Game (Replaced by DP 2010-80)," Discussion Paper 2008-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    7. Van Tassel, Eric, 1999. "Group lending under asymmetric information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 3-25, October.
    8. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/171, Paris Dauphine University.
    9. Arzu Basaran, 2005. "A Method For Strategic Decision Making In A Watershed -Game Theory," ERSA conference papers ersa05p197, European Regional Science Association.
    10. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.

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