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Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment

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  • Massimo Giannini

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

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    Abstract

    In this paper the Signalling approach to the explanation of wage differentials is analyzed both under a microeconomic and a macroeconomic viewpoint. Departuring from the classical Spence's model, the introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to redistributive effects among workers and firms. Moreover the existence of factors related both to local and to parental externalities greately reduce the informative power of education about individual ability.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9704/9704002.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9704002.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: 17 Apr 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9704002

    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP Laser; pages: 23; figures: included
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    Web page: http://128.118.178.162

    Related research

    Keywords: Signalling Earnings distribution Entropy;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
    4. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
    5. Galor, Oded & Zeira, Joseph, 1988. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," MPRA Paper 51644, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 1989.
    6. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
    7. Engers, Maxim, 1987. "Signalling with Many Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 663-74, May.
    8. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
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    Cited by:
    1. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Luisa Escriche, 2006. "Education And Family Income: Can Poor Children Signal Their Talent?," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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