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Job market signaling and employer learning

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  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
  • Prat, Julien

Abstract

We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 147 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1787-1817

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1787-1817

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Keywords: Employer learning; Signaling games; Intuitive Criterion; Multiple pooling;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Berliant, Marcus & Yu, Chia-Ming, 2010. "Locational signaling and agglomeration," MPRA Paper 24155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Luis Santos-Pinto, 2011. "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 11.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo L. Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns," Staff Report 464, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  4. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2011. "Acquired Skills and Learned Abilities: Wage Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f153, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 13 Apr 2014.
  5. Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2011. "A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 163-186, March.

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