This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Kübler, Dorothea
Müller, Wieland
Normann, Hans-Theo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher wages to workers who have invested. However, separation of workers is incomplete and wages do not converge to equilibrium levels. In the signaling treatment, we observe significantly more separating outcomes compared to the screening treatment. Increasing the number of employers leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions but not in the screening sessions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4RKTNCM-2/2/ffc770e2589f4c42190849138262c90b
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 219-236
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:219-236

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords: Job-market signaling Job-market screening Sorting Bayesian games Experiments;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cadsby, Charles B & Frank, Murray & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1990. "Pooling, Separating, and Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 315-42. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lang, Kevin & Kropp, David, 1986. "Human Capital versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 609-24, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin, Stephen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 466-96, Autumn.
  5. Kelly Bedard, . "Human Capital Versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Drop-outs," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 19, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Holt, Charles A, 1985. "An Experimental Test of the Consistent-Conjectures Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 314-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Kubler, Dorothea & Muller, Wieland, 2002. "Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1437-1460, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Cadsby, Charles Bram & Frank, Murray & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1998. "Equilibrium Dominance in Experimental Financial Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(1), pages 189-232.
    Other versions:
  12. Cooper, David J & Garvin, Susan & Kagel, John H, 1997. "Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 553-75, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Layard, Richard & Psacharopoulos, George, 1974. "The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 985-98, Sept./Oct. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 329-53.
    Other versions:
  15. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Riley, John G, 1979. "Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages S227-52, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Lisa Posey & Abdullah Yavas, 2007. "Screening equilibria in experimental markets," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 147-167, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Cooper, David J. & Kagel, John H., 2003. "The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in signaling games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 311-337, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-65, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1977. "Education and Screening," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 949-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. David Cooper & John Kagel, 2008. "Learning and transfer in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 415-439, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 7-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1993. "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 279-302.
  28. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Randolph Sloof & Hessel Oosterbeek & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Does Making Specific Investments Unobservable Boost Investment Incentives?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 911-942, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lisa Posey & Abdullah Yavas, 2007. "Screening equilibria in experimental markets," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 147-167, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.