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Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

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  • Kübler, Dorothea
  • Müller, Wieland
  • Normann, Hans-Theo

Abstract

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher wages to workers who have invested. However, separation of workers is incomplete and wages do not converge to equilibrium levels. In the signaling treatment, we observe significantly more separating outcomes compared to the screening treatment. Increasing the number of employers leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions but not in the screening sessions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 219-236

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:219-236

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Job-market signaling Job-market screening Sorting Bayesian games Experiments;

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References

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  10. Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2003. "Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison," Discussion Paper 2003-124, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lisa L. Posey & Abdullah Yavas, 2007. "Screening equilibria in experimental markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 32(2), pages 147-167, December.
  2. Hornig, Stephan O. & Rottmann, Horst & Wapler, Rüdiger, 2011. "Sorting on the labour market: A literature overview and theoretical framework," OTH im Dialog: Weidener Diskussionspapiere 27, University of Applied Sciences Amberg-Weiden (OTH).
  3. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse20_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Friedrich Poeschel, 2013. "Assortative matching through signals," 2013 Papers ppo178, Job Market Papers.
  5. Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht & Raab, Philippe, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 571-588, October.
  6. Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2008. "Job-market signalling and screening: An experimental study," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-347328, Tilburg University.
  7. Andrei Bremzeny & Elena Khokhlovaz & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards," Working Papers w0164, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  8. Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2013. "Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-208, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  9. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2011. "Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings," DICE Discussion Papers 35, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  10. Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2003. "Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison," Discussion Paper 2003-124, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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