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Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations

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  • Axel Anderson
  • Lones Smith

Abstract

This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in Becker (1973) . This failure holds around the highest (lowest) reputation agents for "high skill" ("low skill") technologies. We find that matches of likes eventually dissolve. In another life-cycle finding, young workers are paid less than their marginal product, and old workers more. Also, wages rise with tenure but need not reflect marginal products: information rents produce non-monotone and discontinuous wage profiles. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00567.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 3-29

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:3-29

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Cited by:
  1. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
  2. Darong Dai, 2012. "On the Existence of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching," Economic Research Guardian, Weissberg Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 201-224, December.
  3. Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria & Antonella Tutino & Anton Cheremukhin, 2013. "A Theory of Targeted Search," 2013 Meeting Papers 664, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Elena Pastorino, 2013. "Job matching within and across firms," Staff Report 482, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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