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Employer Learning, Job Changes, and Wage Dynamics

Author

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  • Seik Kim
  • Emiko Usui

    (Nagoya University and IZA)

Abstract

This paper takes a new approach to testing whether employer learning is public or private. We show that public and private learning schemes make two distinct predictions about the curvature of wage growth paths when there is a job change, because the amount of information transferred to a new employer about workers' productivity is smaller in the private learning case than in the public learning case. This prediction enables us to account for individual and job-match heterogeneity, which was not possible in previous tests. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), we find that learning is primarily public.

Suggested Citation

  • Seik Kim & Emiko Usui, 2012. "Employer Learning, Job Changes, and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers UWEC-2012-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2012-01
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    File URL: http://faculty.washington.edu/seikkim/seikkim_lrnmob.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Araki, Shota & Kawaguchi, Daiji & Onozuka, Yuki, 2016. "University prestige, performance evaluation, and promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 135-148.
    2. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.

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