The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited
AbstractThis paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2309.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Applied Economics Letters, 2011, 18 (7), 607-610
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-09-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2006-09-23 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2006-09-23 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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