Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns
AbstractWe study a market with free entry and exit of firms who can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial unobservable investment. If no learning about this investment occurs, an extreme "lemons problem" develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learning introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. If the market operates with spot prices, simple regulation can enhance the role of reputation to induce investment, thus mitigating the "lemons problem" and improving welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17898.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Guillermo Ordonez & Andrew Atkeson, 2009. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," 2009 Meeting Papers 830, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo L. Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns," Staff Report 464, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-03-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2012-03-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-REG-2012-03-21 (Regulation)
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