Reputation for Quality
AbstractThis paper analyses a model of R&D where the product quality is imperfectly observed by customers. We consider different types of customer monitoring and characterise the equilibrium levels of investment and the resulting reputational dynamics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 81 (2013)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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