1. Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000043, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and debt," Staff Report 125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J., 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 230-261, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Phillip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Working Papers 9805, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
9. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and mutual default," Staff Report 124, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Patrick E. Kehoe & V. V. Chari, 1990. "Sustainable Plans And Mutual Default," IMF Working Papers 90/22, International Monetary Fund.
    • Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(1), pages 175-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 561-79, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
13. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
14. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
16. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
17. Juan-Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-enhancing collusion in the presence of a competitive fringe," Working Papers 0511, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Juan Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-Enhancing Collusion in the Presence of a Competitive Fringe," Documentos de Trabajo 298, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
18. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]