Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

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Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

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Drew Fudenberg
David K Levine

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Drew Fudenberg

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 814577000000000009.

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Date of creation: 13 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000009

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-12-19 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2007-12-19 (Game Theory)

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Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Abreu, D. & Milgrom, P. & Pearce, D., 1990. "Information And Timing In Repeated Partnerships," Papers e-90-14, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
- David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Martin F. Hellwig & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2225-2264, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
- Hellwig, Martin F. & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics 22, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-52, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Other versions:
- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 581-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Equilibrium Degeneracy and Reputation Effects," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000216, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe., 1987. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Economics Working Papers 8746, University of California at Berkeley.
Other versions:
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions," 2006 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000002, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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