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Reputation for Quality

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  • Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

    (UCLA)

  • Simon Board

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper analyses a model of R&D where the product quality is imperfectly observed by customers. We consider different types of customer monitoring and characterise the equilibrium levels of investment and the resulting reputational dynamics.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 160.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:160

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References

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  1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August.
  2. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
  3. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-70, May.
  4. Ana Fernandes & Christopher Phelan, 1999. "A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence," Staff Report 259, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Arantxa Jarque, 2005. "Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence," 2005 Meeting Papers 428, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Resnick, Paul & Zeckhauser, Richard & Swanson, John & Lockwood, Kate, 2003. "The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment," Working Paper Series rwp03-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  7. Bosch, Jean-Claude & Eckard, E Woodrow & Singal, Vijay, 1998. "The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes: Stock Market Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 503-19, October.
  8. Chalk, Andrew J, 1987. "Market Forces and Commercial Aircraft Safety," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 61-81, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Career Concerns with Coarse Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1831, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2012.
  2. Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo L. Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns," Staff Report 464, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2012. "Career Concerns with Coarse Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000342, David K. Levine.
  4. Pierre-Yves Yanni, 2012. "Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012. "Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation," Working Papers 1207, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2012.
  6. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 0. "Breakdowns," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

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