1. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, . "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Penn CARESS Working Papers 5d82f80bcea2483b6387c5b68, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, . ""Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective''," CARESS Working Papres 98-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   • Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S., 1998. "Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Papers 349, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," CARESS Working Papres imp-mon, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
2. Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series 35, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Werner GÜTH & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Klaus RITZBERGER, 1995. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Vienna Economics Papers vie9507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   • Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
4. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
6. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Papers 9485, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
    • Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
14. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
16. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 581-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
19. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," Discussion Papers 0203-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," Working Papers 565, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1237, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games," Discussion Papers 2007-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
5. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1451, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & G. J. Mailath & S. Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 576, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1571, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
6. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
7. Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
9. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September. [Downloadable!]
10. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001513, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Michihiro Kandori, 1999. "Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-45, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
14. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information 0511007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," 2005 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    • William Fuchs, 2007. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1432-1448, September.
15. Massimiliano Amarante, 2002. "Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring," Discussion Papers 0102-48, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS