Potential Competition in Preemption Games
AbstractWe consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players' moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each player's behavior from any time on is independent of the date at which she came into play. We find that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation in terms of eroding reputations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 594.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, vol.�75, n°1, mai 2012, p.�53-66.
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Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-03-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-03-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-03-06 (Game Theory)
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- Rossella Argenziano & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2012. "Clustering in N-Player Preemption Games," Economics Discussion Papers 741, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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