The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
AbstractWe conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lotsâ€”batches of vintage postcardsâ€”under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyersâ€™ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyersâ€™ willingness-to-pay. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Field experiment; eBay; Reputation;
Other versions of this item:
- Resnick, Paul & Zeckhauser, Richard & Swanson, John & Lockwood, Kate, 2003. "The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment," Working Paper Series rwp03-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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