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Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning

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Author Info
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos () (University of Konstanz)
Prat, Julien () (University of Vienna)

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Abstract

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers’ types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3285.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3285

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Related research
Keywords: employer learning; education; job markets; signaling; intuitive criterion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gibbons, R. & Katz, L.F., 1989. "Layoffs And Lemons," Working papers 531, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  2. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2002. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1977. "Education and Screening," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 949-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Giuseppe Moscarini, 2005. "Job Matching and the Wage Distribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 481-516, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steffen Habermalz, 2006. "The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2309, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fabian Lange, 2007. "The Speed of Employer Learning," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 1-35. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

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