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Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons

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  • Brendan Daley
  • Brett Green

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  • Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:4:p:1433-1504
    DOI: ECTA9278
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    1. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2002. "Dynamic Trading in a Durable Good Market with Asymmetric Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 257-282, February.
    2. Johnson, Justin P & Waldman, Michael, 2003. "Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 247-265, Summer.
    3. Georg Noldeke & Eric van Damme, 1990. "Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23.
    4. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    5. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    7. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2005. "Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(2), pages 467-497.
    8. Levin, Jonathan, 2001. "Information and the Market for Lemons," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 657-666, Winter.
    9. Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-442, June.
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    12. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
    13. Curtis R. Taylor, 1999. "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 555-578.
    14. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2012. "The War of Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 707-734.
      • Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2010. "The War of Information," Papers 9-13-2010, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    15. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    16. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
    17. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    18. Alessandro Lizzeri & Igal Hendel, 1999. "Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1097-1115, December.
    19. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    20. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
    21. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
    22. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    23. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    24. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    25. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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