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Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

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  • Kremer, Ilan
  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 133 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 58-82

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:58-82

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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  1. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  2. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  3. Noldeke, Georg & van Damme, Eric, 1990. "Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, January.
  4. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March.
  5. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
  6. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May.
  7. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "Education Signaling with Preemptive Offers," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1175, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Korajczyk, Robert A. & Lucas, Deborah J. & McDonald, Robert L., 1992. "Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric Information," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(03), pages 397-417, September.
  9. Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-42, June.
  10. Korajczyk, Robert A & Lucas, Deborah J & McDonald, Robert L, 1991. "The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(4), pages 685-708.
  11. Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle., 1976. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 41, University of California at Berkeley.
  12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  13. Teoh, Siew Hong & Hwang, Chuan Yang, 1991. "Nondisclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 283-313.
  14. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2012. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 12-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li:, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-048, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Sep 2013.
  3. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, 07.
  4. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  5. Byoung Heon Jun & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Discussion Paper Series 0503, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  6. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2009. "Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party," 2009 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2013. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout Risk, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 24 Apr 2014.
  10. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
  11. Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  12. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.

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