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The War of Information

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  • Gul, Faruk

    (Princeton University)

  • Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

We analyze political campaigns between two parties with opposing interests. Parties pay a cost to provide information to a voter who chooses the policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when parties quit. The parties' actions are strategic substitutes: a party with a lower cost provides more but its opponent provides less information. For voters, the parties' actions are complements and raising the low-cost party's cost may be beneficial. Asymmetric information adds a signaling component in the form of a belief-threshold beyond which unfavorable information is offset by the informed party's decision to continue campaigning.

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File URL: https://www.princeton.edu/~pesendor/warinfo.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy in its series Papers with number 9-13-2010.

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Date of creation: Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:prirpe:9-13-2010

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  1. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady & Martin Cripps, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 39-68, 01.
  2. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  3. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
  4. Giuseppe Moscarini & Lones Smith, 2001. "The Optimal Level of Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1629-1644, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, 07.
  2. Christopher Cotton & Arnaud Dellis, 2012. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," Working Papers 2013-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  3. Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2013. "Gambling in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2033-2048.

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