The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited
AbstractThis article discusses the claim made by Altonji and Pierret (AP) (1997) and Lange (2007) that a high Speed of Employer Learning (SEL) indicates a low value of Job Market Signalling (JMS). It is first discussed intuitively in the light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed by AP (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if Employer Learning (EL) is incomplete, a high SEL is not necessarily indicative of a low value of JMS.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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- Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007.
"Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning,"
2007 Meeting Papers
648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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